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EVERSON TO MEEK AND ROEMER: FROM
SEPARATION TO DETENTE IN
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
JAMES

C.

KIRBY, JR.t

As part of a symposium honoring a leading constitutional law
scholar upon his retirement, it is appropriate to devote an article to what
appears to be a closing chapter of church-state relations under the first
amendment. In 1959 Frank Strong wrote of the metaphorical wall of
separation: "Something of a wall of separation remains, yet it may be
scaled, so to speak, in circumstances where truly important public interests outweigh the seriousness of threatened invasions of individual and
group religious interests."' This has proved to be a more accurate
assessment of trends than most that were attempted during that period.
The balancing that it suggests has prevailed in the free exercise area
and the net results under the establishment clause have been to strike
a sort of balance in permissible aids to religion in general and religious
education in particular.
In 1976 in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland,2 the
Supreme Court completed a process of validating substantial state
financial aid to church-related higher education, soon after effectively
foreclosing support of similar magnitude for education at the elementary and secondary levels (lower education) in Meek v. Pittinger.3 To
some, the results may smack of compromise. The two cases can, however, be reconciled and each rests upon a coherent doctrinal basis that
is part of a practical d6tente upon the entire subject of aids to religious
education. There are grounds for optimism that this topic will recede
as a major source of constitutional litigation and scholarship. Only this
hope and esteem for the symposium's honoree move this writer to add
to the literature of a subject that has already commanded far more than
its fair share of scholarly attention.'
t

Professor of Law, New York University. Like the honoree, the author is

former Dean of the Ohio State University College of Law. Grateful acknowledgment is
made of the research assistance of N.Y.U. law student Frank M. Gregorek.
1. Strong, Church Law: Foreword,20 Ouio ST. L.J. 387, 387 (1959).
2. 96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976).
3. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
4. The scholarly literature on aid to religious education since 1969 includes:
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The tortuous development of this d6tente began in 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education,5 which may hold the record for being cited

most often as a precedent on opposite sides of the same question.
Everson's holding, that New Jersey could constitutionally provide pub-

lic funds for transporting children to parochial schools," lent support for
nearly thirty years to efforts to validate other forms of public support
of secular components of parochial school programs.
It was the strict separationist language of Everson, however, at
odd- with its holding, that was to become a powerful weapon of

opponents of government aids to religion of all types, ranging from public school prayers to tax exemptions. Justice Black's oft-quoted language must necessarily be our beginning point and bears repeating:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
Boles, The Burger Court & ParochialSchools: A Study in Law, Politics, & Educational
Reality, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 459 (1975); Calhoun, The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act and the Establishment Clause, 9 VAL. U.L. REv. 487 (1975); Doerr, The
Enduring Controversy: Parochiaid and the Law, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 513 (1975);
Gianella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement,
1971 Sup. CT. REV. 147; Katz, Radiationsfront Church Tax Exemptions, 1970 Sup. CT.
REv. 93; Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?,
25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107 (1974); Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools and
Church Colleges: The Lemon, DiCenso, and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 567 (1971);
Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69
MIcH. L. REV. 179 (1970); Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools:
A Final Installment?, 1973 Sup. Or. REV. 57; Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion
Clauses and the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 883 (1976); Pfeffer,
Aid to ParochialSchools: The Verge and Beyond, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 115 (1974); Pfeffer,
The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115 (1973); Powe, Evolution to
Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 371 (1974);
Smith, Emerging Consequences of Financing Private Colleges with Public Money, 9 VAL.
U.L. REV. 561 (1975); Sugarman, Family Choice: The Next Step in the Quest for Equal
Educational Opportunity?, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 513 (1974); Underwood, Permissible Entanglement under the Establishment Clause, 25 EMoRY L.J. 17 (1976); Zoetewy,
Excessive Entanglement: Development of a Guideline for Assessing Acceptable Church.
State Relationships,3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 279 (1976).
5. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
6. Id. at 18.
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they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practicereligion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended
'7
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Despite its inconsistency with the Everson holding, this strict separationist, or no-aid, view of the establishment clause dominated the subject of government aids to religion for the next two decades. ("Everson" will hereafter refer to the quoted no-aid dictum.)
Everson was followed in 1948 by McCollum v. Board of Education,8 invalidating programs under which religious organizations supplied teachers for voluntary religious instruction on public school
premises during school hours. McCollum, however, was soon to be
countered by a decision of opposite thrust in Zorach v. Clauson.9
There, Justice Douglas wrote for the majority in upholding released
time programs under which voluntary religious instruction was given by
religious groups off the school premises, but during school hours and
aided by the school's compulsory attendance machinery. Zorach
included an eloquent passage that was frequently to be quoted in
opposition to Everson. It too bears repeating:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one
group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the
10
best of our traditions.
When the school prayer cases arose in the early sixties, Zorach
and Everson stood as competing accommodationist and separationist
tools of analysis. Neither proved to be adequate to the tasks of those
cases and the school-aid cases that were to follow.
7. Id. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))
(emphasis added).
8. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The McCollum case, which received much more critical
attention at the time than did Everson, was viewed by Leo Pfeffer as the greater prize,
well worth the Everson holding. He saw at the time that the cause of separation would
be aided much more by the Everson no-aid doctrine than it would be harmed by its
holding. Pfeffer, Religion, Education and the Constitution, 8 LAw. GUILD REV. 387

(1948).
9. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
10. Id. at 313-14.

566

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 5

The first prayer decision, Engel v. Vitale,II produced a firestorm
of public reaction, both for its holding and for its reasoning. Much of
the criticism resulted from Douglas' concurrence, conceptually opposed
to his Zorach reasoning, in which he pointed to a number of accepted
governmental involvements with religion and, quite unprophetically,
pronounced the invalidity of all. 2 Black's majority opinion, carefully
limited to the invalidity of officially composed and sponsored religious
services, disclaimed the thrust of Douglas' concurrence but it was nonetheless a somewhat doctrinaire exercise in Everson-like strict separationism.
The holdings of Engel and Abington School District v. Schempp,1 1
the latter a prayer and Bible reading decision, drew wide support from
constitutional scholars as logical and necessary disapprovals of official
sponsorship of devotional services in governmental programs. However, one respected scholar, who approved the results of the cases on
free exercise grounds, thoughtfully faulted the Court on its misuses of
first amendment history and systematic distortion of first amendment
values. He was Mark De Wolfe Howe of Hariard who developed his
thesis at length in 1965 in his last work, The Garden And The
Wilderness.
Howe noted that there were two separate and somewhat conflicting strands of first amendment history. He viewed Everson, McCollum
and Engel as looking exclusively to a Jeffersonian strand which he
characterized as "political" and as reflecting the anti-clerical bias of
eighteenth-century rationalism. Jefferson's wall of separation, which
was detailed specificaly as law by Virginia's Act for Establishment of
Religious Freedom,' was to keep church and state apart to safeguard
against ecclesiastical depredations and excursions into both public and
private interests. A full reading of that Act drives home its underlying
distrust of organized religion and a full realization that Jeffersonian
separation was anti-clerical and designed to protect the state from being
misused as an instrument of the church.
In Howe's view, this religiously hostile political strand of first
amendment history must compete with a more sympathetic theological
strand traceable to Roger Williams, another principal architect of our
11. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
12. Id. at 437 n.1.
13. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
14. 12 W. HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE 84-86 (1823) (recited in VA. CODE § 57-1
(1974)).
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heritage of religious freedom. Howe drew his title from an earlier
separationist metaphor in a classic passage from Williams which he
quoted more fully as follows:
The faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the
world, abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under the
Old Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians under
the New Testament in the antitype, were both separate from the
world; and that when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall
of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness
of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed
the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day.
And that therefore if He will ever please to restore His garden and
paradise again, it must be of necessity be walled in peculiarly unto
Himself from the world; and that all that shall be saved out of the
world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world, and
added unto his church or garden. 15
Thus, Roger Williams' wall of separation was designed to protect
the garden of the church from being overrun by the wilderness of the
state and outside world in the form of corrupting effects of government
involvement. The Williams strand of separation as interpreted by
Howe, and later by Professor Wilber Katz,' 6 does not forbid all governmental aids to religion--only those incompatible with religious freedom. The prayer decisions were viewed by Howe as embodying a
"radical analysis" that unnecessarily bypassed free exercise grounds of
coerciveness in order to place in question public favors to religion having no substantial secular purposes, without regard to whether dangers
7
to personal liberty are threatened by such public favors.'
The Court soon shifted its analysis and moved from Jefferson
closer to Roger Williams in evolving its establishment clause doctrine.
Howe had easily reconciled Roger Williams' wall of separation with tax
exemption of churches, which had been brought in question by Douglas' Engel concurrence. In 1970, in Walz v. Tax Commission,18 the
Burger Court upheld such exemptions under what Chief Justice Burger
called "benevolent neutrality."' 9 The decision brought approval from
Wilber Katz in the names of both Howe and Williams.2"
15. M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-6 (1965) (quoting P. MILLER,
His CoNTRIBuroN TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98 (1953)).
16. Katz, supra note 4.
17. M. HOwE, supra note 15, at 143.
18. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
19. Id. at 669.
20. Katz, supra note 4, at 97.

ROGER WILLIAMS:

568

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Howe's posthumous vindication was, however, to be considerably
less than total. He also supported the validity of aid to parochial
schools as consistent with historic first amendment values, ' though he
did not suggest that Roger Williams would be equally comfortable with
public support of Catholic schools. Here Howe's position did not prevail because he had failed to consider a third strand of first amendment
history. As Richard Morgan has pointed out,2 2 Howe somewhat simplistically read the first amendment as embodying no anti-establishment value independent of freedom of worship. This ignored an
important strand of history that is traceable to James Madison's famous
"A Memorial and Remonstrance" 2s against religious assessments. This
strand brings to the establishment clause the independent value of
avoidance of religio-political strife.
While strife-avoidance was not to become a full-fledged element
of first amendment doctrine until the Burger Court's decisions of the
seventies, it had figured along the way in the reasoning of several justices. Justice Rutledge had drawn directly from Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance in his ringing dissent from the Everson holding,
saying:
Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or
other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect
against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers
alone will benefit most, there another. That is precisely the history
of societies which have had an established religion and dissident
groups ....
It is the very thing Jefferson and Madison experienced and sought to guard against, whether in its blunt or in its
more screened forms .... The end of such strife cannot be other
than to destroy the cherished liberty. The dominating group will
achieve the 24
dominant benefit; or all will embroil the state in their
dissensions.
In Schempp, Justices Goldberg and Harlan condemned the official
school religious services at issue there as involving the state "so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those
very divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion
Harlan repeated this
clauses of the First Amendment preclude."2
21. M. HOWE, supra note 15, at 117.
22. R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 185-86 (1972).
23. 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298-304 (R. Rutland & W. Rachel eds.
1973).
24. 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947). Rutledge cited specific provisions of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance and attached the full text to his opinion as an appendix.
25. 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963).
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consideration in his concurring opinion in Board of Education v.
Allen,20' and Justice Douglas relied upon it heavily in dissent. Douglas
viewed the textbook loan program upheld in Allen as inviting continuing strife over the content of books between public school boards and
27
parochial school officials.
The Allen decision was criticized on strife-avoidance grounds by
Paul Freund of Harvard, regarded by some as "the tenth Justice of the
Supreme Court."2 8 His perceptive and widely noted article29 was soon
to be influential in school-aid cases and to be cited for the Madisonian
proposition that "political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was designed to protect." 30
The Burger Court's full recognition of the strife-avoidance value
began when it announced the "entanglement" criterion in WaIz. 1'
Previously, under the two factor test of Schempp, it had assessed aids
to religion for secular purposes and for primary effects that neither advance nor inhibit religion. As originally announced in Walz, administrative entanglement of government with religion was the primary concern. To tax was to become entangled. The next year, however, in
the first round of the school aid cases of the seventies, the Court added
the test of potential political divisiveness, either as a separate fourth
factor or as a refinement of the entanglement factor.
Some feel that Madisonian principles and ease of analysis are both
best served by treating administrative entanglement and political
divisiveness as embodying the single value of strife-avoidance. As
Richard Morgan noted in reviewing the 1973 school decisions, "It
strains the imagination to conceive of a real-world situation where government would begin, by design or accident, to exercise control within
a religious institution which would not quickly result in religio-political
strife." 32 This unification has not yet emerged in the multiple opinions
of the Court, but recent results are consistent with it.
The injection of entanglement in Walz caused the textbook loan
victory in Allen to be a false signal that other secular components of
26. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
27. Id. at 265.
28. See Wyzanski, The Third Sulsbacher Memorial Lectures, 7 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV.405, 407 (1975).
29. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAgv. L. REv. 1680 (1969).
30. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
31. 397 U.S. at 670.
32. Morgan, supra note 4, at 65 n.32.
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parochial school programs could similarly be financed. In a series of
cases in 1971, 1973 and 1975 the Court struck down every new form
of such aid, including supplements of salaries of teachers of secular subjects,8 3 institutional reimbursement of costs of textbooks and other neutral materials, 8 4 state income tax deductions for tuition payments,
tuition reimbursement grants for low income parents, direct institutional grants for maintainence and repair of facilities,", institutional
reimbursement of the costs of required testing and recordkeeping3" and
reimbursement of costs of secular auxiliary services. 8 7 In Meek, the
1975 finale, textbook loans survived on the strength of Allen despite
their logical similarity to the other neutral instruments of secular
instruction that were denied public financing. The only explanation
was stare decisis. 8
During substantially the same period the Court was reaching
opposite results for analogous aid to church-related colleges and uni0 it upheld single-shot construction
versities. In Tilton v. Richardson"
grants for buildings and facilities required to be used for secular educational purposes.40 In Hunt v. McNair,4 ' it upheld similar aid through
42
state-guaranteed revenue bonds. The blockbuster came in Roemer,
in which a five to four majority sustained annual noncategorical grants
to support the sectarian educational functions of church-related colleges. Here the Court sustained a form of substantial direct institutional aid to religious higher education which it had denied to lower
education. Recurring annual appropriations had been viewed by the
Court in lower education as having a fatal potential for divisiveness.
Nonetheless, in both Meek and Roemer the Court has remained
faithful to the three-pronged establishment clause test as it evolved
from Walz. In both cases secular legislative purposes can be conceded,
but the cases are distinguishable as to primary effects and entanglement.
The differing results are most notable for the triumph of Madison's
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Facilities
41.
42.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Id. at 359-61.
403 U.S. 672 (1971).
The Tilton Court, however, struck down a provision of the Higher Education
Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-703 (1970), limiting that use to 20 years.
413 U.S. 734 (1973).
96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976).
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strife-avoidance by the incorporation of political divisiveness with
administrative entanglement.
It may be conceded that the primary purposes of legislative
supporters of lower school aid are to help preserve parochial schools
as providers of secular education. To accept such schools as satisfying
the public purpose behind compulsory education laws but to forbid public funds from following that public purpose is troubling. There is logic
in Justice White's dissenting language:
Positing an obligation on the State to educate its children, which
every State acknowledges, it should be wholly acceptable for the
State to contribute to the secular education of children going to sectarian schools rather than to insist that if parents want to provide
their children with religious as well as secular education, the State
will refuse to contribute anything to their secular training. 43
The difficulty is that the extension of this reasoning would allow
the state to finance the entire secular component of parochial schooling,
or at least all that can be treated as separable. This would make the
church and the government working partners in the total educational
function of the church. Without rebuilding a Jeffersonian wall, one can
still be offended by the form and degree of government aid to religion
that would inhere in such a partnership. Without returning to the "noaid" absolutism of Everson, one can consistently say that the first
amendment means at least "no partnership."
Furthermore, the predominance of secular purposes is not controlling in first amendment analysis; violations of the Bill of Rights
might often serve useful secular purposes. Public morality and convenience might be aided by religio-political partnerships, but the establishment clause condemns such partnerships in the interest of other and
higher values.
In analyzing Meek and Roemer, one must recognize that aids to
religious lower education advance religious belief in a vastly different
way than do aids to higher education. At the lower levels, Catholic
education is an integral part of the practice and propagation of the
Catholic faith. Justice Jackson developed this at length in his Everson
dissent" and Catholic representatives do not deny it. Indeed, a leading spokesman recently pointed to the pervasively religious quality of
43. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 814-15 (1973), quoted
with approval in Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
44. 330 U.S. at 18.
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their schooling in the course of claiming a right to public support.
Consider the following:
In the past, many Catholic educators talked, as I did, about being
"partners with public schools" and looked to them to see how
Catholic schools were doing. We now are just about ready to say
we are not partners but competitors. We know the market for
schools is going to be extremely tight. The great shortage ahead,
even more severe than the shortage of money, is going to be a
shortage of students. Because the competition for students is going
to be so intense, forward-looking Catholic educators are ready to
say to the public schools: We will take you on; we are going to
run the best schools ever put together. We will have schools permeated with values from the moment the pupils arrive until they
leave. We are not going to ape the public schools. We will implement our theology and our philosophy of education all the way.
Our schools won't be partners because they are going to be radically different from
the public schools. They are going to be
45
radically Christian.
Such value-laden education will still satisfy minimal state secular
education requirements and continue to relieve the public schools and
treasuries of great burdens. Nonetheless, aid for such pervasively
religious education must have a primary effect of advancing the
Catholic religion. Government can hardly be allowed, consistent with
the first amendment, to become a financial partner in such evangelical
missions.
By contrast, under national standards of academic freedom and
tenure, there is much truly separable secular instruction in churchrelated higher education. Such separability is to be a condition of valid
aid under the Roemer decision. The nation's higher secular education
needs are being met at many such institutions that by common knowledge are not, in the Court's words, "pervasively sectarian."4
The
latter, those institutions that still have primarily evangelical missions,
seem unlikely to dilute their evangelical effort by publicly claiming to
be nonsectarian in order to obtain state aid.
The third criterion, entanglement or strife-avoidance, is even more
convincing as a basis for different results at the higher and lower education levels. One need only look at the parties in the lower education
cases to appreciate the divisive potential of such aid. Catholic
45. McManus, Felix Culpa-Report from the Ad Hoc Committee on School Aid,
20 CAT. LAw. 347, 354-55 (1974).
46. 413 U.s. at 743.
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groups are regularly pitted against Protestants, Jews, civil libertarians, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which fears diversion of funds from public schools.
Annual lobbying efforts for substantial appropriations with demands
for ever increasing portions could make legislatures into continuous religious battlegrounds with intensifying effects of religious intolerance
and divisiveness.
Higher education is a different scene and has not been similarly
divisive. 41 Even Thomas Jefferson, as Rector of the University of
Virginia, endorsed a form of state aid to theology schools under which
their students obtained scientific instruction and library privileges at the
University."8 More recently, the lobbying efforts of private higher education have become something of a unifying factor. Non-sectarian
private colleges and universities in some states are presenting a united
front with church-related institutions at both federal and state levels in
seeking public support for all. Also, sectarian institutions of other than
the Catholic faith are much more likely to share in state aid to higher
education than at the lower levels, where beneficiaries of aid are predominantly if not exclusively Catholic. A clue to the difference
is that one of the three higher education cases involved South Carolina
aid to a Baptist college.4 9
Thus, the entanglement test is both conceptually and pragmatically
successful. It restores the Madisonian strife-avoidance strand to doctrinal analysis and it achieves a compromise that will permit substantial
aid to church-related education at the higher levels, perhaps thereby
freeing some church resources for relief at the lower levels.
Whether entanglement will generally be successful as an analytical
tool and in variations from the education models dealt with to date remains to be seen. The critic who at one point faulted Mark Howe
for overlooking the strife-avoidance establishment value later questioned its use as a doctrinal premise in the school-aid cases because it
is "almost universally unexamined.""0 Another who has closely examined it views it as displaying paranoia as to lower education and
47. Underwood, supra note 4, at 48.
48. For brief elaboration, see P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 11416 (1964); Underwood, supra note 4, at 46-50.
49. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
50. Morgan, supra note 4, at 96. For a brief rejection of strife avoidance as an
independent value, see Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause

Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 710-11 (1968).
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undue optimism as to higher education and concludes that it is a doctrine that "is less one of mature, reasoned decision-making and more
one of a fickle, erratic adolescence."'"
The Court undoubtedly is acting intuitively. It is also sweeping
broadly and with somewhat authoritarian generalizations, 5 2 but towards
real alleviation of religio-political strife. Results to this point are encouraging. Further refinement may be necessary as unavoidable questions of degree arise, but it appears that the entanglement criterion has
settled the basic principles and their application to most factual variations. If so, church and state have arrived at something of a detente,
as that term has recently been used to describe relations between
coexisting powers."'
Like the other, this d6tente is not internally consistent in all
respects. It continues at least three precedents of permissible aid to
religious education that cannot be reconciled with current doctrine.
This is illustrated by a recent Virginia case 4 involving a released time
program like that in Zorach. The federal district court reexamined
Zorach in light of the contemporary three-pronged test and concluded
that the second part was violated by a primary effect that advanced
religion. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, principally on
ground that Zorach is still "good law." Despite logical inconsistency with the modern test, Zorach was deemed to be controlling
because it had been cited approvingly in the Meek opinions." The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Zorach and released time, like Allen and textbook loans, seem
sure to remain valid, if only by virtue of stare decisis. School transportation seems similarly secure because the Everson holding is frequently
cited as an example of permissible aid. School lunches and public
health services have been approved by dictum. These aids, along with
tax exemption of school property and income tax deductibility of contributions to the sponsoring religious organizations, add up to a significant
package of aid to lower education. Taken with Roemer's approval of
51. Underwood, supra note 4, at 62.
52. Kauper, 25 CAsE W. REs. L. Rnv. 107, supra note 4.
53. Application of the term to church-state relations is consistent with the dictionary definition: an easing or relaxation of strained relations and political tensions between
nations.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, unabr. (G. & C. Merriam

Co. 1961).
54. Smith v. Smith, 391 F. Supp. 443 (W.D. Va.), revd, 523 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 856 (1976).
55. 523 F.2d at 124-25.
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more substantial aid to higher education, the d6tente appears not to be
ungenerous to religious education as a whole. Detente is not defeat.
The result is a mosaic of inconsistencies, but a net combination
that permits some aid to religion, but not too much. Along with other
positive involvements of government with religion, this detente should
help to preserve our religiously pluralistic society. As Wilber Katz has
eloquently sketched it, key elements in such a society include toleration, dialogue, realization by groups and individuals that they have
stakes in each other's religious freedom and "sensitivity to the differing needs of various groups and a disposition to accommodate these
needs." 5° It is hoped that excessive concern for entanglement will not
endanger this pluralism, in which both division and divisiveness must
necessarily inhere.
The conceptual result is also something of a detente among the
competing historic strands of first amendment history. Jefferson's
political or anti-clerical strand prevails in Engel and Schempp with their
bans on official religious services in public schools. Roger Williams'
wall between the garden and the wilderness is respected by freeing
churches from taxation in Walz. Finally, Madison's strife-avoidance
value is the key to Meek and Roemer and the higher-lower dichotomy
in aids to religious education.
Thus, on both historic and pragmatic grounds Walz, Meek and
Roemer may prove to be major achievements of the Burger Court and
key elements in our new wall of separation, which has come more to
resemble an artful latticework.
56. Katz, supra note 4, at 107.

